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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joseph Mauro contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during his trial by
misrepresenting the law in her rebuttal closing statements to the jury, statements to
which he contemporaneously objected.

Specifically, he asserts the prosecutor

improperly represented the scope of what the State had to prove vis-à-vis the elements
of the charge of aiding and abetting insurance fraud. As a result, this Court should
vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
After he and his then-girlfriend, Carol Holloway, broke up, Mr. Mauro made
voluntary statements to

both

law enforcement

and

an

insurance

company

representative informing them that Ms. Holloway had made a claim that her tractor had
been stolen when, in fact, he had simply left it on a friend’s property.1 (Tr., p.149,
Ls.1-17, p.173, L.9 - p.174, L.7.)

In his voluntary deposition with the insurance

company, Mr. Mauro explained that Ms. Holloway had been in on the plan to hide the
tractor and collect on the insurance policy, but she did not learn exactly where
Mr. Mauro had taken the tractor until after making the claim. (Exhibits, p.37, Ls.15-20,
p.42, Ls.6-9.) Mr. Mauro admitted he had reported the tractor stolen to the police.
(See, e.g., Exhibits, p.36, Ls.3-24.) Additionally, Mr. Mauro admitted he had discussed
the claim with the claims adjuster. (Exhibits, p.33, L.20 - p.34, L.11.) Mr. Mauro also
stated he had driven Ms. Holloway to the insurance office, but he did not accompany

Ms. Holloway independently contacted the police through her attorney, reporting
where the tractor could be found. (Tr., p.158, L.22 - p.160, L.2.)
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her while she made the claim on her policy. (Exhibits, p.39, Ls.8-18.) Ms. Holloway
filled out a Sworn Proof of Loss statement with the insurance company, which stated it
was her policy and she was the only owner of the tractor. (Exhibits, p.1.) In that sworn
statement, she also asserted:
I did not intentionally cause this loss, nor did I conspire with others to
cause it. All property, both real and personal, mentioned in this sworn
proof of loss or contained in the attached schedules was destroyed,
stolen, or damaged at the time of the loss. I have not concealed property
from the company and have made no attempt to deceive the company in
any manner about the extent of this loss.
(Exhibits, p.1.)
Ultimately, Mr. Mauro was charged with insurance fraud.

(R., pp.29-30.)

Specifically, the State alleged:
[Mr.] Mauro . . . did aid and abet another in presenting false information to
[the insurance company] in support of a claim for payment of a benefit
under an insurance policy, with the knowledge that the information was
false as to a material issue of the claim, and with the intent to defraud or
deceive [the insurance company] by claiming that his [sic] insured vehicle
had been stolen.
(R., p.29.) Ms. Holloway was not charged in relation to these events. (See Tr., p.203,
Ls.4-7.)
Mr. Mauro decided to exercise his right to a jury trial. The State presented his
statements to both law enforcement (Exhibit 2) and the insurance company (Exhibit 9)
as evidence during the trial. (See Tr., p.174, L.8 - p.177, L.25; Tr., p.190, L.20 - p.193,
L.11) The State also presented Ms. Holloway’s Sworn Proof of Loss statement. (Tr.,
p.142, L.6 - p.143, L.13.) Although subpoenaed to testify at the trial, Ms. Holloway
stood on her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. (See Tr., p.188, L.11 -

2

p.189, L.22 (discussing Ms. Holloway’s decision out of the presence of the jury before
she had been formally called to testify).)
During his closing argument, defense counsel drew the jury’s attention to Jury
Instruction 18, which instructed, inter alia: “The participation of each defendant in the
crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Tr., p.232, Ls.6-8; R., p.113.)
Accordingly, defense counsel argued that, in order to prove Mr. Mauro had aided and
abetted Ms. Holloway in making a false statement, the State had to prove Ms. Holloway
had actually committed insurance fraud, in that she knew her claim was false at the time
she made it. (Tr., p.231, L.23 - p.232, L.9.) He then argued the State had failed to
carry its burden in that regard because the assertions Ms. Holloway made in the Sworn
Proof of Loss statement, combined with the fact that she had not been charged in this
matter, showed she did not have knowledge of a plan to defraud the insurance
company. (Tr., p.232, L.9 - p.233, L.8.)
In her rebuttal statements, the prosecutor argued:
Instruction 17 [the elements instruction] doesn’t have anything in there
about whether or not Ms. Carol Holloway had knowledge. This is about
the knowledge that Mr. Mauro had, that when he assisted her, when he
drove her to the insurance company to file that report, his knowledge, the
information he provided her, that he reported the tractor stolen and that he
filed the police report -- his knowledge that that was false. It does not ask
you to consider her knowledge -(Tr., p.234, L.19 - p.235, L.2.) Defense counsel objected to that argument, asserting the
prosecutor had misstated the law.

(Tr., p.235, Ls.3-4.)

The district court did not

expressly overrule or sustain the objection, saying instead, “the instructions do set forth
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the law. I’ll let the jury sort that out.” (Tr., p.235, Ls.5-6.) The jury ultimately found
Mr. Mauro guilty of insurance fraud.2 (R., p.122.)
The district court subsequently imposed a unified sentence of three years, with
one year fixed, on Mr. Mauro, which it suspended for a two-year period of probation.
(R., pp.144-48.)
Conviction.

Mr. Mauro filed a notice of appeal timely from the Judgment of

(R., pp.158-60.)

It also found Mr. Mauro guilty of a misdemeanor charge of resisting or obstructing law
enforcement for filing a false police report. (See R., pp.30, 122.)

2
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ISSUE
Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the law to the jury.
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ARGUMENT
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Misstating The Law To The Jury
When the appellate courts review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct to which
there was a contemporaneous objection, the appellate court will “determine factually if
there was prosecutorial misconduct, then [will] determine whether the error was
harmless.” State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 868 (2014) (internal quotation omitted).
A prosecutor commits misconduct by misstating the law during closing argument
to the jury. State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 170 (Ct. App. 2008). The relevant law in this
case is set forth in I.C. § 41-293.

(See R., pp.29-30.)

That statute has several

subsections which define various means of committing insurance fraud. See I.C. § 41293. The language in the charging document (R., pp.29-30) and Jury Instruction 17
(R., p.112) mirrors the language in I.C. § 41-293(b), which defines one type of insurance
fraud as:
Any person who, with intent to defraud or deceive an insurer assists,
abets, solicits, or conspires with another to prepare or make any
statement that is intended to be presented to any insurer, producer,
practitioner or other person, in connection with, or in support of any claim
for payment or other benefit, knowing that such statement contains false,
incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material
to such claim.
I.C. § 41-293(b).

In her rebuttal closing statements, the prosecutor argued that

Ms. Holloway’s knowledge of the falsity of the statement was irrelevant to a charge
under this particular statute. (Tr., p.234, L.19 - p.235, L.2.) Both Idaho Supreme Court
and Idaho Court of Appeals precedent reveal the prosecutor was mistaken.
As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, “To be an aider and abettor one
must share the criminal intent of the principal; there must be a community of purpose in
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the unlawful undertaking.”

State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 386 (1985) (internal

quotation omitted). This “community of purpose” requirement existed in the aid-andabet context even though I.C. § 18-204 provided, then as now, that, regardless of the
nature of a person’s participation in the crime, all participants could be charged as
principals of the offense. As such, what the Scroggins Court said is: even though all
the people involved in the offense are equally culpable (i.e., they are all treated as
“principals”), that common culpability arises because the participants share a common
intent, a community of purpose. Thus, if there is a person whose actions may forward
the criminal goal, but who does not share in the community of purpose to achieve that
goal, that person is not a culpable participant. Compare State v. Perez, 99 Idaho 181,
183 (1978) (explaining that the reason a confidential informant is not liable as an
accomplice in the criminal act on which he is informing, even though he participates in
the act, is that he “lacks the requisite criminal intent”).
The Court of Appeals subsequently elaborated on this point, making the rule
even clearer: “mere knowledge of a crime or assent or acquiescence in its commission
does not create accomplice liability through aiding and abetting. Aiding and abetting
contemplates a sharing by the aider and abettor of the criminal intent of the perpetrator.”
State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2008); accord. State v. Romero-Garcia,
139 Idaho 199, 204 (Ct. App. 2003); see also Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10,
25-26 (1980) (explaining that, in prosecuting an accessory under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2, which
also provides that all people involved in a crime are culpable as principals, the
Government has “the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [the principal]
violated [the relevant statute] and that petitioner aided and abetted him in that venture”).
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Thus, for the State to establish aid-and-abet liability, it has to show a joint criminal intent
by both the accessory and the principal, in this case, Mr. Mauro and Ms. Holloway.
Therefore, the prosecutor’s assertion – that Ms. Holloway’s knowledge was
irrelevant, that all the State had to prove was that Mr. Mauro himself knew the statement
was false (Tr., p.234, L.19 - p.235, L.2) – is a misstatement of the law. Mr. Mauro’s
“mere knowledge of a crime or assent or acquiescence in its commission” is not
sufficient to establish aid-and-abet liability. Mitchell, 146 Idaho at 383. Rather, the jury
has to conclude the State met its burden to prove there was a “community of purpose,”
a shared criminal intent between Mr. Mauro and Ms. Holloway, in order to find the State
met its burden to prove Mr. Mauro had aided and abetted in the making of a statement
intended to deceive an insurance company in support of a claim. Scroggins, 110 Idaho
at 386. Thus, the prosecutor committed misconduct by misrepresenting the law as to its
burden of proof in this case.
Since the prosecutor’s misrepresentation of the law reduced the burden of proof
as to what the State had to prove vis-à-vis the elements of the offense, this Court
should vacate Mr. Mauro’s conviction.

When the prosecutor commits this type of

misconduct, it is no longer possible to determine whether the jury convicted based on
the law as set forth in the instructions, or whether it followed the prosecutor’s erroneous
representation of the law.3 See State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87 (Ct. App. 2007)
(quoting State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44 (1903)) (acknowledging that prosecutors
“occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to

This is particularly true since the district court did not give a instruction clarifying what
the instructions required the jury to find.

3
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their statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the
jury than they will give to counsel for the accused.”) In cases where it is not possible to
determine whether the verdict was based on a proper or improper theory, “this court
must vacate the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.” State v. Luke, 134
Idaho 294, 301 (2000). Put another way, the State will be unable to meet its burden to
prove there is not a reasonable possibility that the error in this case did not contribute to
the verdict actually rendered by the jury, and thus, that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010) (articulating the

standard for objected-to error); cf. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). As
such, the misconduct in this case amounts to reversible error.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Mauro respectfully requests this Court vacate the judgment of conviction and
remand this case for a new trial.
DATED this 7th day of October, 2016.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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